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Abstract—Quantum computing has evolved quickly in recent
years and is showing significant benefits in a variety of fields.
Malware analysis is one of those fields that could also take
advantage of quantum computing. The combination of software
used to locate the most frequent hashes and n-grams between
benign and malicious software (KiloGram) [1] and a quantum
search algorithm could be beneficial, by loading the table of
hashes and n-grams into a quantum computer, and thereby
speeding up the process of mapping n-grams to their hashes.
The first phase will be to use KiloGram [1] to find the top-k
hashes and n-grams for a large malware corpus. From here,
the resulting hash table is then loaded into a quantum machine.
A quantum search algorithm is then used search among every
permutation of the entangled key and value pairs to find the
desired hash value. This prevents one from having to re-compute
hashes for a set of n-grams, which can take on average O(MN)
time, whereas the quantum algorithm could take O(
√
N) in the
number of table lookups to find the desired hash values.
Index Terms—quantum, malware, quantum computing,
Grover’s algorithm, hashgram, ngram
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computing, while still in its infancy, is quickly
evolving and becoming practical. Each day something is being
discovered, making these new concepts applicable across a
variety of domains. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s,
quantum computing was entirely theoretical and came directly
from the ideas of quantum physics. Many of the early al-
gorithms created then have since provided a foundation on
which to build other quantum algorithms. While many of these
algorithms, such as Simon’s [2] and Grover’s [3], were seen as
proof of concept or ”toy” algorithms, they in fact have more
value on their own merits than simply providing a foundation
for other algorithms. For example, Simon’s algorithm [2]
makes use of a 2-to-1 function and 2-to-1 functions are often
found in the domains of quantum cryptography as well as other
domains of cybersecurity.
Though the situation is improving, one of the current
limitations has to do with availability of quantum computing.
While companies such as IBM [4] and D-Wave [5] are
providing access to their quantum backends at no cost via
cloud platforms, they are still limited in the number of qubits
one can use. For that reason, much of our work is done
using Qrack [6], a quantum simulator. Even simulators have
limitations based on your classical hardware (approximately
30 qubits).
One of the first steps in malware analysis is to search
the suspect binary file for strings that indicate the program’s
purpose, what malware family it might belong to, and indeed
whether it is malicious or not [7]. It is also desirable to
compare the suspect binary with other binaries, malicious or
not, to see if the suspect binary is similar to any of them.
An n-gram is a sequence of n contiguous bytes, for some
small integer n. Files that happen to have many of the same
n-grams, in roughly the same proportions, can be regarded as
similar [8]. Historically, the value of n might be in the range
2-6. But unlike ordinary text, executable binaries use most if
not all of the characters in the range 0x00 to 0xFF. For n
of 4, for example, that results in 2564 or roughly 4 billion
possible n-grams to be tabulated. More recently, as described
below, larger values of n are also of practical value, but in
tabulating n-grams for any n larger than say 3 or 4, a hash
table would be used to keep track of which n-grams have
been seen, and how often. Hash tables are usually sized so
that collisions don’t matter too much in practice. As a file is
ingested, though, a lot of n-grams are seen multiple times,
and the same hash value is computed multiple times. We will
show how to improve n-gram tabulation by calculating an
n-gram’s hash once, storing the result, and using quantum
search to find the desired hash value, without recomputing it,
should that n-gram be seen again. This paper is organized as
follows: in Section II we provide a review of related work.
We present the concept of quantum search as applied to n-
grams in Section III. Our numerical and simulation results are
presented in Sections IV and V. In Section VI we summarize
our results and make suggestions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. n-grams for Malware Analysis
Cybersecurity professionals are constantly under pressure
to identify and neutralize incoming threats. While anti-virus
software is essential in current times, it is not always able
to keep up with the threat.Often a new piece of malware is
released and performs some sort of damage before its signature
is identified and updates made in the anti-virus databases.
Leveraging the latest techniques in machine learning, static
analysis of malicious software has become a great tool in the
arsenal against malware. [7] A large variety of malware is
in the form of PE32 executables that target the Microsoft
Windows operating systems. One example use of n-grams
would be to take sequences of bytes from a PE32 executable
to construct features [9]. Once such sequences of bytes are
identified, the feature selection process goes through and
eliminates duplicate or irrelevant pieces of information from
the dataset. Using n-grams as features has proven effective in
malware detection, showing up to a 97% detection rate [9].
There are a number of machine learning techniques used
for malware detection [9]. Using n-grams as features are
what makes it possible to leverage automated and intelligent
classification methods. n-grams can be used for data, but also
to represent a sequence of opcodes, as well as operating system
API calls such as AdjustTokenPrivileges for Win32 and execve
for Linux.
B. KiloGram
KiloGram [1] was released as open source software in
2020.1 KiloGram takes a set of benign and known malicious
software as input data. The output will be a list of the top-
k most frequent n-grams found that are contained within the
malicious software. Benign software is any software that is
considered to not contain any malicious code where malware
is any software that is design to cause harm in some fashion.
We chose the KiloGram approach since it can be used for a
large number of n-grams and large values of n. Of use to us,
the KiloGram algorithm can handle ngrams that are 8-bytes
or larger while keeping 1000 or more of the most frequent
entries.
In the context of malware analysis, n-grams are used to
represent strings that appear in some if not all members of a
set of suspected malware specimens. These n-grams then can
be provided to other algorithms for a variety of uses, such as
classification into malware families. KiloGram was designed
with these uses in mind. Recall that the n in n-gram refers
to some small integer n. For example, if we wish to process
a 4-byte string such as 0xABCD, you would see this called
a 4-gram. Unfortunately one major drawback of an n-gram
based approach for malware detection, is that the shorter the n-
gram, the more likely you will also find the byte sequence also
benign software, making your rate for false positives increase.
Fortunately, KiloGram was also designed to overcome this
limitation by allowing the storing of larger and more specific
n-grams, increasing the likelihood they will be unique within
a variety or family of malware.
1 https://github.com/NeuromorphicComputationResearchProgram/KiloGrams
C. Grover’s Algorithm
Grover’s algorithm [3] was one of the first quantum search-
ing algorithms to be developed. Grover’s has even been
the inspiration for other quantum algorithms such as Shor’s
[10] factoring algorithm. While much attention and research
has been specifically around Shor’s algorithm with regards
to quantum cryptography, Grover’s has been used and even
improved upon in recent years [11].
Grover’s search algorithm implements what is known as
an amplitude amplification algorithm [12] which has been
said to be a generalization of Grover’s algorithm (although
amplitude amplification was first discovered in 1997 by Gilles
Brassard in 1997, and then a year later by Lov Grover). The
fundamental idea is to increase (amplify) the probabilities
of the desired results, and this is accomplished by using a
sequence of reflections.2 What is occurring in the amplitude
amplification is that the reflections are rotated closer to the
desired quantum state along the Bloch Sphere. The target state
is marked as sin2(Θ) so that when the amplitude amplification
algorithm is applied m times, the probability of obtaining the
correct state is sin2((2m+ 1)Θ) In other words, we think of
the target state on the Bloch Sphere [13] and we keep rotating
it until we find the correct result, with each rotation getting
slightly closer.
III. QUANTUM N -GRAM SEARCHING
A. Amplitude Amplification
Referring back to the previous statements, we explain that
instead of looking up a value by key, we do a direct lookup
by value. The reason being is we essentially have to invert
the key/value lookup problem when dealing with quantum en-
tanglement. Grover’s search [3] makes heavy use of quantum
entanglement. What this algorithm will do is when a lookup
table is loaded into a quantum machine, Grover’s algorithm
will entangle all permutations of potential key and value pairs
based upon the input. The next step is to perform what is
known as amplitude amplification to the entangled pieces of
data. Prior to the actual amplitude amplification, the oracle is
queried which places a tag value equal to our search value
As part of amplitude amplification, a tag value that equals the
search value is placed into memory and then the phase (sign)
is flipped.
While amplitude amplification may sound like a phrase
belonging in signal processing, it is heavily used in quantum
mechanics to describe the nature of things, and it happens
that most of those things happen to be analogue. For practical
purposes, in quantum computing amplitude amplification and
phase flipping refer to changing the sign of a value. For
example, say we look at the following matrix and we wish
to locate the value at row 1, column 3:
AB CD EF12 97 85
2D 3F 9C


2https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/quantum/libraries/standard/algorithms
Once we perform the phase flip, we will get the following
matrix: 
AB CD -EF12 97 85
2D 3F 9C


For our purposes, this tag value is our n-gram we wish to
locate and the key is the hash provided (which is also the
index value). As mentioned, the key and value are entangled
and with each lookup (iteration) of Grover’s search, we can
visualize the Bloch Sphere is rotated closer to the desired n-
gram with each iteration.
B. Quantum Fourier Transform
Anything written about topics such as signal processing and
quantum mechanics would be remiss if it failed to mention
the Fourier Transform.3We are given a function f(x) and the
Fourier Transform breaks down f(x) to its constituent fre-
quencies [14]. The conceptual structure of quantum mechanics
defines the existence of pairs of complementary variables p
and q connected by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. We
can measure a particle’s quantum mechanical position, but by
doing so we lose information about the particle’s momentum
[14]. Going deeper into quantum mechanics, this gets into
what is known as the wave-particle duality of nature, for which
the physical state of a particle can be described by a wave
function. The wave functions are used to describe the physical
state of a particle and one can use either a function of p or
a function of q, but never both. The real vector space that is
the set of all possible physical states and which contain the
p-axis and q-axis is known as a phase space.
Referring back to phase shifting and amplitude amplification
as part of the algorithm, quantum mechanics choose a specific
polarization of a defined space and picks a subspace containing
half of its dimensions. In contrast to picking all of the points
within this selected space that contains the q-axis, the quantum
Fourier transform takes the set of all complex-valued wave
functions on the axis [14]. We then examine the p-axis which
while also having a valid polarisation, has a set of possible
states of a particle related to the first representation by the
Fourier transform:
Φ(p) =
∫
ψ(q)2pii
pq
h dq (1)
Physical states exist inside what is known as an L2 space,
which is a vector space (specifically a measure space) that
contains all of the squarable integral functions. Due to this
property, an L2 space is also a Hilbert space [15]. According to
Plancherl’s theorem,4 Fourier Transforms also exist inside a L2
space. A Fourier Transform within a L2(Rn) space applied to
itself is unitary, which upholds the requirement for all quantum
computing operations to be unitary.
3https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Fourier transform
4https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF03014877
IV. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
A. Grover’s Circuits
Grover’s algorithm is an oracle based algorithm and in the
majority of the literature that discusses Grover’s algorithm, it’s
typically split into four parts:
1) Initialization
2) Oracle processing
3) Amplitude amplification
4) Measurement
We now describe how a quantum simulator, in particular Qrack
[6], implements both the oracle and amplification components
of Grover’s search.
|0〉 /n H •
Oracle
X H • H
Measure|0〉 /n H X H Z H
Figure 1. Example Grover’s Circuit
|key〉 /k H •
Oracle
X H
UZ
H
MReg
|value〉 /v H X H H
CM IndexedSBC IndexedADC
Figure 2. Qrack Implementation Grover’s Circuit
Figure 1 describes a quantum circuit for a standard Grover’s
search implementation. Figure 2 shows Qrack’s implementa-
tion of the quantum circuit for Grover’s search over a key and
value pair. A few comments on the notation: /n is shorthand
to state that each of the gates apply to n qubits. In the Qrack
example, we chose /k and /v to represent the number of qubits
used for the key and value. We use a Uz to represent a phase-
flip operation. We chose this over the standard Pauli-Z gate
since we want a single permutation’s phase flipped instead
of flipping the phase on every individual |0〉. In the Qrack
implementation, we are applying the phase-flip to all of the
used qubits simultaneously. That is, we start out with setting
our qubit permutations to |0〉. Next we apply a Hadamard gate
to each of the qubits to place them into superposition where
each qubit now equals 1√
2
|0〉+|1〉 and 1√
2
|0〉−|1〉. The second
step of this circuit is to place all qubits through the oracle as
defined in Grover’s algorithm. The next series of gates are
CNOT gates which were previously place in superposition,
the superimposed values of |1〉 will trigger a NOT operation
on the target qubits. The IndexedSBC operation is in reference
to Qrack’s IndexedSBC [16] operator that we will cover later
in section IV. We proceed with the phase-amplification part of
the circuit by applying either an X or NOT gate on all qubits
followed by both a Hadamard gate and a custom unitary phase-
flip gate. Finally, we complete the circuit with another series of
Hadamard gates, followed by IndexedADC which is Qrack’s
IndexedADC [16] operation, and proceed with measurement
of the resulting quantum state.
|key〉 /k
UZ|value〉 /v
CM DEC INC
Figure 3. Qrack Implementation Grover’s Oracle
Figure 3 describes a quantum circuit for the Qrack imple-
mentation of an oracle used for Grover’s algorithm. While the
oracle might look small in comparison to the entire Grover’s
circuit, it’s absolutely crucial to the algorithm. In the Qrack
[6] implementation of the oracle, we start by doing a DEC
operation for all qubits. This instruction is what starts the
tag process by subtracting the target value from a start value,
typically 0. For example, if our target value is 100 then we
would have 0 − 100 = −100. From here we do Uz gates on
all qubits, flipping the phases of their respective amplitudes.
Practically, this translates to flipping the sign of the bits so in
the above example, this would make our value +100. Lastly,
the oracle reverts the previous DEC operation with Qrack’s
INC operation to return to the original value, only with the
sign flipped. To finalize our example, we add 0 + (+100)
where + is the phase, with our result being +100.
Theoretically, Grover’s algorithm requires an average of
O(
√
N) lookups to find a match for the specified target.
While we are using a traditional lookup table for Grover’s, the
input time complexity evaluation might not be that obvious.
If we dive into the bare fundamentals of Qrack/VM6502q,
we notice we have a IndexedLDA instruction [16]. This is a
modified LOAD instruction that allows loading a key with a
superimposed index into a quantum register. The IndexedLDA
operation is unitary by design so it will not affect the overall
quantum state as it is loaded into the registers. The writing of
the data with a superimposed index, will actually entangle the
classical memory cache and the index register. Knowing this,
we can say that the IndexedLDA operation takes O(1) to load
data into quantum registers. In addition to the initial loads,
there will be an input time complexity of O
(√
M
N
)
where
M is the total number of keys in the lookup table and N is
the total number of matches [17]. This yields an overall input
time complexity of O(1) + O
(√
M
N
)
= O
(√
M
N
)
.
We use the term lookups but practically we mean iterations
of Grover’s algorithm. To be specific, Qrack uses the following
equation to determine the number of iterations to use [16]:
floor
[
pi
4 arcsin2( 1√
2N
)
]
(2)
V. SIMULATED RESULTS
A. Qrack Operations
The Qrack [6] implementation utilizes some specialized
methods for implementing many of the operations in the oracle
and amplitude amplification portions of the algorithm. Here
are some of the most commonly used operations: [16]
IndexedLDA: Set 8 bit register bits by a superposed
index-offset-based read from classical memory.
IndexedADC: Add to entangled 8 bit register state
with a superposed index-offset-based read from clas-
sical memory.
IndexedSBC: Subtracts to entangled 8 bit register
state with a superposed index-offset-based read from
classical memory.
INC: Integer addition without sign.
DEC: Integer subtraction without sign.
H: Hadamard gate implementation.
ZeroPhaseFlip: Controlled Z-gate implementation.
Z: Z-gate implementation, non-controlled.
X: X (NOT) gate implementation.
MReg: Measures the current state of a quantum
register(s).
B. Benign vs. Malicious Datasets
As briefly mentioned in Section II, there are some lim-
itations with quantum simulations, the most obvious being
limited computing resources available for simulation. While
Qrack [6] can take full advantage of a GPU for processing
using OpenCL5, one typically is limited to simulating ap-
proximately 30-qubits. Qrack has some development branches
of code where they are simulating 128-qubits for testing
the quantum supremacy problem released by Google [18],
however, these branches are quite experimental. To better
appreciate why 30 qubits is a limitation for simulation, we
must recall our base formula 2n where n is the number
of qubits we wish to simulate. 2n specifically refers to the
total amount of quantum states we wish to simulate. With 30
qubits, we end up with 230 = 1073741824 or roughly one
billion values. But the amplitudes represented by the quantum
states are complex numbers, so we must include the real and
imaginary parts when factoring in memory requirements. We
use 22 bytes for the real value and 22 bytes for the imaginary
value. This then gives us 22+2 = 16 bytes for each of those
one billion values, or
230+4 = 17179869184 bytes ≈ 16GB (3)
Qubits Real Bytes Imaginary Bytes Total Memory
4 2 2 256 bytes
8 2 2 4 KB
16 2 2 1 MB
24 2 2 ≈ 268MB
28 2 2 ≈ 4GB
30 2 2 ≈ 16GB
32 2 2 ≈ 64GB
40 2 2 ≈ 17TB
Table I
SIMULATIONMEMORY ALLOCATION
5https://www.khronos.org/opencl/
For our simulation, we used the following datasets created
and used in the KiloGram project [1]:
Benign Benign Files Malicious Malicious Files
Windows 7 System32 4565 Vxheaven 2015 284151
MAML 691 VirusShare 2018 131072
Table II
BENIGN VS. MALICIOUS SOFTWARE DATASET
Benign Malicious n-gram size Kept n-grams
Windows 7 System32 Vxheaven 2015 3 bytes 64
Windows 7 System32 Vxheaven 2015 2 bytes 16384
Windows 7 System32 Vxheaven 2015 2 bytes 4096
MAML VirusShare 2018 3 bytes 64
MAML VirusShare 2018 2 bytes 2048
MAML VirusShare 2018 2 bytes 1024
Table III
BENIGN VS. MALICIOUS SOFTWARE n-GRAMS
The hardware and software used was a 16-Core Intel Xeon
E5-2630 @ 2.4Ghz with 32GB RAM and two GeForce GTX
1660 video cards. The machine was running 64-bit Ubuntu
Linux 18.04 and OpenCL 1.2. As one can see, due to the
limitations of approximately 30-qubits, we had to select the
number of bits for our key and value size with care. Since
n-grams are typically byte sequences, we were limited to a
maximum of n-grams with n set to 3. Using 3-grams gave
us 24-qbits for our n-gram value with 6-qbits remaining for
our index values. Utilizing a 2-grams gave us a much larger
span of bits to use for our index value (14-qbits). Recall that
the index for this is the hash for a specific n-gram, and since
KiloGram utilizes Rabin-Karp hashing modulo B where B is
the KiloGram bucket size [1].
Number of n-grams Number of Lookups (iterations)
64
√
64 = 8
128
√
128 = 11.31 ≈ 12
256
√
256 = 12
512
√
512 = 22.63 ≈ 23
1024
√
1024 = 32
2048
√
2048 = 45.25 ≈ 46
4096
√
4096 = 64
8192
√
8192 = 90.50 ≈ 91
16384
√
16384 = 128
Table IV
GROVER’S LOOKUPS FOR n-GRAM SIZES
As we can see from Table IV, more n-grams requires more
iterations and the number of iterations increases by a much
smaller amount as we keep a larger number of n-grams. Using
a practical example, below we describe pseudo-code for the
Qrack implementation of Grover’s algorithm in addition to
showing the output for a 2-byte n-gram with a 10-bit index.
We search for a n-gram with the value of 0xF3D7 which has
an unknown hash, which we quickly find to be 0x3a9.
C. Example Hash Retrieval for N -gram: 0xf3d7
Table V is an example where we search for an n-gram with
the value of 0xF3d7 that has a hash value of 0x3a9.
0> chance of match:0.00876619
1> chance of match:0.0242241
2> chance of match:0.0471087
...
22> chance of match:0.98967
23> chance of match:0.998456
24> chance of match:0.999461
After measurement (of value, key, or both):
Chance of match:1
Ngram: f3d7
Hash: 3a9
Total Iterations: 25
Table V
SEARCHING FOR THE HASH OF n-GRAM 0xF3D7
D. Qrack Pseudo-code
In Algorithm 1 we show pseudo-code utilizing Qrack that
is an implementation of both an oracle and amplitude ampli-
fication for Grover’s search.
Algorithm 1 Qrack Grover’s Search Implementation
idxLen = 10
valLen = 16
cryIdx = idxLen+ valLen
ngrams = ngramtable[indexLength]
ngram = 0xf3d7
qReg = CreateQuantumInterface(∗params)
qReg = SetPermutation(0)
qReg = H(valLen, idxLen)
qReg = IndexedLDA(valLen, idxLen, 0, valLen, ngrams)
procedure TAGVALUE(tP erms,qReg, valueSt, valLen)
qReg = DEC(tP erms, valueSt, valLen)
qReg = ZeroPhaseF lip(tP rems,valueSt, valLen)
qReg = INC(tP rems, valueSt, valLen)
end procedure
procedure AMPLITUDEAMPLIFIATION
idxLen = 10
valLen = 16
cryIdx = idxLen+ valLen
ngrams = ngramtable[idxLength]
ngram = 0xf3d7
qReg = CreateQuantumInterface(params)
qReg = SetPermutation(0)
qReg = H(valLen, idxLen)
qReg = IndexedLDA(valLen, idxLen, 0, valLen, ngrams)
end procedure
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that combining the results of an efficient
n-gram collection software such as KiloGram with quantum
computing, we can provide a faster way of finding a computed,
but momentarily unknown hash for a known n-gram. We
have compared this solution to the classical approach, and
have shown that for a large number of n-grams, the quantum
based solution outperforms them substantially. When better
quantum hardware is available, these concepts could be applied
to cryptographic hashes, such as SHA-256. We hope that
our work will remain useful when better quantum computers
are available. Quantum computing research is continuing to
grow each day and while it might seem that adequate enough
hardware is far into the future, it is will be upon us before we
realize and cybersecurity professionals will need to be ready.
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